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Law schools provide little training in science.' On the whole,
practicing lawyers are not proficient in statistics and research methods, and,
it is safe to say, have scant desire to become so. It is perhaps not surprising,
therefore, that evidentiary rules that apply to expert witnesses often appear
to have been borne out of ignorance, and applied capriciously. No practice
better reflects this than courts' tendency to exempt experience-based expert
opinion from generally applicable standards for expert testimony. Although
federal courts expressly reject the idea that non-scientific expert testimony
is exempt from generally applicable evidentiary requirements,2 they
nonetheless do exactly this in a wide variety of contexts. California courts,
for their part, unabashedly distinguish between scientific expertise and
ordinary expert opinion and apply rigid standards to the former but lax, if
not nonexistent, standards to the latter.3 Whether explicit or implicit,
however, this practice defies logic and contradicts centuries of scientific
learning. It is an artifact of early scientific thought that should have been
abandoned in the time of blood-letting and phrenology.
Traditionally, the discussion regarding expert evidence has concerned
the permissiveness versus the restrictiveness of expert admissibility rules.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE
IN THE LAW Xii (1999).
2. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999).
3. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976); see infra Part III.
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Hence, the California and federal practices of exempting certain kinds of
expertise might be understood as simply relaxing the otherwise restrictive
standards of ordinary rules of admissibility. But the underlying structure of
an admissibility regime is not uni-dimensional, as this discussion suggests.
Admissibility standards, in fact, vary along two continuous dimensions that
appear to be largely independent of one another. An admissibility ruling
might be permissive or restrictive and it might use either a standard that
defers or one that does not defer to the professional field from which the
expert comes. This Essay considers the California and federal practices of
adopting varying standards for different expertises in light of this two-
dimensional model of admissibility regimes.
II. THE THEORY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE RULES
Much of the contemporary debate about expert evidence has revolved
around two famous federal court decisions. The first is the 1923 District of
Columbia Circuit Court decision in Frye v. United States.4 The second is
the 1993 United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.5 Under Frye, scientific expertise is admissible if it is
generally accepted in the particular field from which it comes. 6  The
Daubert test conditions admissibility on a finding that the basis for the
scientific expertise is valid.7 The principal difference between the two tests
is that Frye relies on the respective expert fields to determine validity,
whereas Daubert calls upon courts to primarily assess the methods and
principles underlying proffered expertise.
Following Daubert, a persistent debate arose over whether one test or
the other was more restrictive in its admission of expert evidence. 8 The
empirical research on this issue has furnished a mixed picture. Sometimes
Frye is more restrictive, sometimes Daubert is, and much of the time they
produce similar outcomes.9 Upon reflection, this is not terribly surprising,
since the two tests can be fairly easily manipulated in order to obtain the
desired result. Frankly, a court that is results-oriented can reach the desired
outcome using either Frye or Daubert. Much of the problem with both
4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923).
5. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
7. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580.
8. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, 43-44 (2d ed. 2006-07) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE].
9. See infra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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Frye and Daubert is that the tests were framed and subsequently developed
in a theoretical vacuum. It is not entirely clear what legal or scientific
cultural values are being advanced by these two tests. As a consequence, it
is difficult to measure their respective success, since we do not know
exactly what they are trying to accomplish.
Stepping back from the tests themselves, it is worth considering the
underlying principles that ought to dictate the composition of an
admissibility test for expert evidence. Based on historical practice, there
are two basic issues that must be addressed regarding this decision point.
The first is, how active should judges be in the role of "gatekeeper"?' ° The
second is, how should judges carry out this designated responsibility, that
is, what are the components of the test? Hence, the potential for variability
in evidentiary decision making in this area varies along two basic
dimensions. As regards the first dimension, concerning how a jurisdiction
defines the judge's role in screening expert opinion, jurisdictions could
adopt an active judicial role in screening evidence, while others might
exercise little or no oversight. The two poles of the second dimension,
concerning the nature of the test used to assess proffered expert testimony,
can be represented by the alternative tests set forth in Frye and Daubert.
The first dimension, the mode of assessment, is largely a question of
what criteria courts use to assess expert testimony. Among contemporary
courts, this is basically a matter of a choice between a general acceptance
test, like that set forth in Frye, or a validity assessment, as described in
Daubert. Frye-like tests typically focus on whether experts from a
particular field accept the empirical basis for the opinion. Under tests of
general acceptance, courts largely defer to the conclusions of some
identified group of professionals. The Daubert test, on the other hand,
queries whether the expert opinion is based on sound methods and
principles." Under the Daubert test and similar validity inquiries, courts
assume the primary responsibility of evaluating the empirical bases of
proffered expert opinion.' 2 The essential difference between Frye and
Daubert is profound. A Frye test contemplates that judges need bring little
or no knowledge of research methods to the admissibility decision.' 3 The
10. 1 assume that courts have some gatekeeping role in regard to expert testimony, an
assumption basic to the structure of all evidence codes. The role may be restrictive or permissive,
but, just as with hearsay and character evidence, judges have some supervisory responsibilities
over expert evidence.
11. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580.
12. Id. at 592.
13. In fact, however, the proper application of Frye should require some measure of scientific
sophistication. Without some basic knowledge of science and scientific disciplines, judges cannot
know which scientists to survey to assess general acceptance. In the area of polygraphs, for
2008]
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test can be applied simply by counting the noses of members of the
pertinent field. In contrast, Daubert requires judges to have fairly
developed empirical sensibilities, since they must evaluate the methods and
principles underlying the proffered expertise.
14
Along the second dimension, the threshold level for admissibility, legal
standards vary from rigorous to permissive. The more permissive the legal
standard, the greater the quantum of expert testimony that will be heard by
the trier of fact. A jurisdiction's decision regarding how high the bar
should be set for experts typically depends on its resolution of the classic
problem of defining the proper roles for judges and juries in the trial
process. A high threshold indicates a relatively active judicial role in
screening expert opinion for the jury. A low threshold leaves the evaluation
function primarily to jurors. The issue regarding the division of fact-
finding between judge and jury is a highly complex one, and can depend on
such factors as the relative institutional competencies of the two,
constitutional requirements, and the nature of the evidence involved. In the
area of expert evidence, establishing the division of fact-finding
responsibilities between judge and jury depends on such broad
considerations as competence to make the assessment, avoidance of wasted
time or confusion of the issues, fairness to the parties, efficiency, and many
others.
The two dimensions of mode of assessment and threshold level roughly
define most admissibility regimes in the United States. These two basic
dimensions manifest themselves in practice into four basic approaches to
the judicial role regarding expert evidence: (1) Daubert-rigorous. (2)
Daubert-permissive, (3) Frye-rigorous, and (4) Frye-permissive. These
evidentiary options can be illustrated in a basic 2X2 Table. (See Table 1).15
Somewhat surprisingly, the two dimensions underlying admissibility
decisions appear to be largely independent. While Daubert is often
perceived and applied by courts rigorously, it is regularly described as
being a permissive test. 16 Similarly, Frye is typically considered a rigorous
example, limiting the field surveyed to polygraph examiners is obviously inappropriate. They
have a vested interest in the answer to the Frye question, and, indeed, might not even have the
expertise to assess the validity of the technology. Instead, courts would be well advised to consult
with experts from several related fields, including experimental psychology, psycho-physiology
and statistics. Yet in the forensic identification areas, such as latent fingerprint identification or
firearms analysis, courts regularly ask only the narrow group of self-interested technicians
whether the technology that underlies their livelihoods is generally accepted. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the answer is a resounding yes. Surveys of the fields of astrology and tea-leaf
reading would produce similar results.
14. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580.
15. See infra tbl. 1.
16. See, e.g., State v. Leep, 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (W. Va. 2002) (The court observed that "the
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test, but is often employed in a permissive manner.
17
TABLE 1
Threshold Set for Admissibility





It must be emphasized that the choice is not categorical, since each of
the dimensions represents a range of alternatives. Thus, the threshold can
be set anywhere between utterly permissive to highly restrictive, just as the
mode of assessment can be fully deferential to a respective field to non-
deferential to that field. For instance, as regards the latter dimension, mode
of assessment, the Daubert test itself is not entirely non-deferential in its
approach. Of the four factors suggested as criteria of scientific validity -
testability, error rate, peer review and publication, and general acceptance18
- only the first two are non-deferential, while the latter two reflect
deference to the respective field. One could certainly imagine an
admissibility standard that is considerably less deferential than this.
The situation, however, is somewhat more complex than this 2X2
model might suggest, for a couple of reasons. First, as noted at the start of
this Essay, some jurisdictions create an exemption for non-scientific,
experience-based, expert opinion. Specifically, some jurisdictions employ
prior 'general acceptance' standard espoused in Frye... is obsolete and has been replaced by the
more liberal determinative criteria enunciated in Daubert.").
17. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1209 (1980) (noting that how a court
defines the relevant scientific community can affect the admissibility of the evidence, essentially
making it easier to find "general acceptance").
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what they call a "relevancy test" for expert testimony.' 9 In effect, then, a
third dimension exists and can operate either as an admissibility regime
itself or as an exception to an otherwise applicable regime for certain kinds
of expert testimony. This third option, however, is really no test at all,
since it posits only the most basic queries common to all evidence codes,
such as the relevance of the testimony and the competence (i.e.,
qualifications) of the witness. A second complication comes from the fact
that while the 2X2 table describes the basic range of admissibility regimes
available, particular jurisdictions might employ different regimes to
different kinds of expertise. Hence, for example, a Daubert jurisdiction that
does not apply the rule established in that case to non-scientific expertise,
might operate in a Daubert-restrictive way for some kinds of evidence and a
Daubert-permissive way for other kinds of evidence.2 °
The concept of admissibility regimes has both prescriptive and
descriptive value. It is descriptive in the sense that it could be used to
describe a jurisdiction's approach to particular kinds of expert evidence. As
Figure 1 illustrates, it might be possible to grade a particular jurisdiction's
admissibility opinion along each continuum in order to graph their
approaches to the subject. This should be done based on the standards
employed in the cases rather than the specific outcomes reached in the
cases. Very strong evidence should be admitted under the most restrictive
test and very weak evidence will be excluded under even a permissive test.
For example, DNA profiling would pass muster under a strongly non-
deferential high-threshold test, but a police officer's gang-profile evidence
might fail under a highly deferential low-threshold test.2 '
19. See, e.g., State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
20. See, e.g., Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1004 (Alaska 2005) ("But we have never
adopted Kumho Tire's extension of Daubert to all expert testimony.... [W]e limit our application
of Daubert to expert testimony based on scientific theory, as opposed to testimony based upon the
expert's personal experience.").
21. See generally 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 8, at 73-79.
[Vol. 36
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The prescriptive value of the admissibility regime model is two-fold.
First of all, it represents a jurisdiction's basic value-system regarding the
boundary between judge and jury (permissive vs. restrictive) and its view of
the proper criteria that should be used to set that boundary (deferential vs.
non-deferential). Second, the model provides a scheme by which
comparisons can be made between different kinds of expert evidence within
and between jurisdictions. Within jurisdictions, for example, it might be
argued that courts should be consistent in the test that they apply to expert
evidence, unless good reasons exist otherwise. Between jurisdictions, the
model permits comparisons of how courts approach the same kinds of
expertise. Figure 2 provides an illustration of how such comparisons might
look.
2008]


















III. THE OPINION RULE
In the remainder of this Essay, I consider California and federal
practice in light of this prescriptive aspect of the model. As noted above,
California exempts non-scientific expertise from its otherwise
restrictive/deferential rule of decision.22 And federal courts, as noted,
implicitly relax their restrictive/non-deferential rule of decision for certain
kinds of expert evidence, in particular, forensic science.23 The question
presented is whether these practices are justified.
A. California Theory and Practice
California divides the world of expert evidence into two basic
categories. On the one hand, experts sometimes offer opinions that are
based on scientific or technical processes or tests, while, on the other hand,
experts sometimes offer opinions based on professional experience. The
former opinion is thought to be particularly worrisome, because of the aura
22. See Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244-45.
23. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty
Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 110 (2000).
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of certainty that might surround opinion based on the seeming wizardry of
science. Using Frye, California erects evidentiary barriers to this sort of
expert opinion, fearing that it might overwhelm the tender sensitivities of
fact-finders. In contrast, expert opinion that is based on experience, and
which claims no pretensions to scientific exactitude, does not receive this
close evidentiary review. In effect, California exempts experiential expert
opinion - or non-scientifically derived opinions - from the rigors of
evidentiary review. This practice, one employed explicitly or implicitly in
many jurisdictions, is often referred to as the "opinion rule. 24  In this
Essay, I argue that the opinion rule, which is an explicit aspect of practice
under the California Code25 and an implicit component of federal practice,
especially in criminal cases, 26 is contrary to basic principles of science and
common sense. It should be abandoned in favor of an explicit consideration
of the question of whether the particular proffered expert opinion should be
the subject of testing and how much testing it should have received before it
can be admitted.
Consider the case of People v. Miller,27 in which a California appellate
court applied the opinion rule and held that psychiatric and psychological
testimony predicting future violence under the state's Sexually Violent
Predator Act is not scientific evidence subject to Kelly-Frye.2 8  The
defendant had complained that the state's expert had relied on statistical
tests that should have been demonstrated to be generally accepted by the
relevant scientific community. The Miller court, however, rejected this
argument, pointing out that the expert's opinion was clinically-based and
the statistical tests were used at most to support an experience-based
clinical judgment. The court explained "that since the expert's opinion
testimony was not based solely on the actuarial evidence, but rather on a
variety of factors and the expert indicated such evidence was not infallible,
a Kelly hearing was not required.,
29
Under the California approach to expert testimony, therefore,
psychological clinical opinion that is not primarily based on statistical
techniques is admitted with no Kelly-Frye threshold check, but
psychological opinion that is premised on such technology confronts the
24. David L. Faigman, John Monahan, Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of the Law's
Scientific Age, 56 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 631, 653 (2005).
25. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2007).
26. See infra Part IV; see also Risinger, supra note 23, at 143.
27. People v. Miller, No. IM18148, 2005 WL 768749, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 6,2005).
28. Id. (citing People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1248-51 which developed the Frye test,
subsequently known as the Kelly-Frye test for admissibility of expert opinion).
29. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1246 (discussing a pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility of
voiceprint evidence); Miller, 2005 WL 768749, at * 1.
2008]
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formidable barriers of that test. In effect, the California rule means that
expert opinion with little or no scientific basis is readily admitted, but
opinion that is based on scientific test must survive the Kelly-Frye gauntlet.
This approach is particularly perverse in the context of predictions of
violence, since research has consistently demonstrated over the last five
decades that actuarial prediction is more accurate than clinical prediction.3 °
Indeed, some studies indicate that using actuarial predictions of violence
alone is more accurate than using clinical and actuarial methods in
combination. 3' This suggests that clinical judgment can actually detract
from the power of actuarial tests. Moreover, research in the last decade is
leading to the development of ever more powerful actuarial technology, so
the gap between clinical judgment and actuarial methods is likely to further
widen. Yet the California approach effectively gives a free pass to
experience based clinical judgment and erects substantial barriers to the
introduction of science-based actuarial techniques.
California and other jurisdictions advance two basic arguments in
support of the rule that relaxes evidentiary standards for experience-based
expert opinion. The first is not always spelled out, but such a regime must
presume that a dividing line can be identified between scientific and non-
scientific evidence. The second argument advanced to support the
California rule is the belief that jurors are more likely to be impressed by
the aura of infallibility that surrounds scientific opinion, but can critically
assess non-scientific opinion readily enough. I consider these in turn.
1. Distinguishing Science from Non-Science
Although there is certainly a distinction to be drawn between science
and non-science, logic does not recommend its use to support a rule that
would allow non-scientific opinion easy admission and enact substantial
hurdles to the admission of science based evidence. That something is not
science is hardly reason to admit it for the jury's consideration. The more
pertinent question concerns the methods that were employed to study the
underlying hypotheses of interest. Although there is no one method or
paradigm that is uniquely "scientific," some methods of study are clearly
"non-scientific." The California courts, however, have not explored this
issue in any depth, but have merely assumed that a line dividing science and
non-science is readily identifiable. Other courts applying the opinion rule
30. PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954); see also Robyn M.
Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668, 1668 (1989).
31. Dawes et al., supra note 30, at 1669.




have sought to define the parameters of the boundary between science and
non-science.
The most ambitious attempt to set forth the premises underlying the
opinion rule was advanced by the Arizona Supreme Court in Logerquist v.
McVey.33 The court held that the Frye test, the state's ordinary rule of
admissibility for scientific evidence, did not apply to non-scientific expert
opinion.34 The court explained that "Frye is applicable when an expert
witness reaches a conclusion by deduction from the application of novel
scientific principles, formulae, or procedures developed by others. 35
However, the court argued, Frye "is inapplicable when a witness reaches a
conclusion by inductive reasoning based on his or her own experience,
observation, or research. 36 Hence, for the Logerquist court, opinion based
on inductive reasoning is not subjected to any substantial threshold test, but
opinion that stems from deductive reasoning receives close scrutiny.
The subject of the expert opinion in Logerquist was repressed
memories. According to the court, this subject "has not yet been
appropriately tested. 237  Thus, repression cannot qualify as science.
Nonetheless, the court believed that an expert's experience with the
phenomenon still made the testimony probative, because the "[p]laintiff
does not claim her memories are proved true as a matter of scientific fact.
3 8
Presumably, however, the plaintiff did claim that her memories were true as
a matter of fact, just not as a matter of "scientific fact.",
39
The error the Logerquist court makes is believing that scientific
knowledge is discrete or categorical. It is not. The scientific method is a
process. Indeed, it is a process that invariably begins with experience. A
medical doctor, for example, might observe that blood-letting relieves his or
her patients' headaches and thus develops a hypothesis regarding both the
mechanism and effectiveness of this therapy. This experience might be
multiplied by additional cases. Of course, it is to be expected that not all
patients benefit from blood-letting therapy, but experience might well
demonstrate that many do. Does experience demonstrate the effectiveness
of blood-letting? For many centuries it did. In Arizona, it presumably still
does.
33. Logerquist v. McVey, I P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000).
34. Id. at 123.
35. Id. at 133.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 134.
38. Id. at 133.
39. Logerquist, I P.3d at 116 (stating that the defendant contended that the plaintiffs
memories were not real or accurate, implying that the plaintiff claimed that her memories were
true as a matter of fact).
20081
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A good scientist would systematically examine this hypothesis,
comparing for instance, blood-letting to drug therapies, such as Advil,
pseudo-therapies (such as a sugar pill placebo), or no therapy. The results
of such a research project would be the product of the scientific method. In
that sense, and that sense alone, they can be described as "scientific." But
there is no threshold that marks a statement as "science" or "scientific."
Hypotheses and theories are valuable only to the extent that good research
methods corroborate them. Of course, the hypothesis that an association
exists between blood-letting and headache relief was supported by clinical
experience. In this sense, that hypothesis was a product of the scientific
method too, since observation is part of that method. It is just that casual
observation can often be very wrong, so scientists typically seek to bring
additional methods to bear on any hypothesis. The point is that observation
is not separate from the scientific method, it is an integral and necessary
part of it. But it is merely the first step and, contrary to the Arizona court's
conclusion, deserves no special deference.
Consider the example of repressed memories, the subject of the
Logerquist decision. A doctor might have examined one or more people
who claim to have begun remembering things of a disturbing nature that
they had previously not known about. A scientist's approach to this
observation would be at least two-fold. On the one hand, employing
inductive reasoning, a scientist might look for further instances of this
phenomenon. The initial observation could have been an anomaly or not
accurate for a variety of reasons. In seeking confirmation, the wise
researcher would want to ensure that the underlying traumas occurred, that
the amnesia was not explainable by other factors - such as biological
amnesia - and that the reports of repression were not spurious products of
expectations of either the subjects or researchers. At the same time, using
deductive reasoning, the scientist would seek to integrate his or her
observations into what is generally known about human memory and the
brain. Does this observation conform to theory? Perhaps theory suggests
another explanation for the recalled memories other than repression. Or
possibly - and of potentially great excitement for the scientist - the theory
itself needs to be adjusted to account for these newly discovered facts.
There is no single recipe for how to conduct a scientific investigation.
The scientific method is not really just one method at all. It is a rigorous,
critical, and careful approach to the development of knowledge. 40 Different
empirical subjects require different paradigms to study them. An
40. See generally SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE - WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN
SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM (2003).
[Vol. 36
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entomologist might study ants in the laboratory and in the rain forest. A
physicist might study the motion of water droplets in a vacuum chamber
and in a waterfall. A psychologist might study the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications in the laboratory and in the field. Scientists know that each
method has its advantages and disadvantages and what is learned from one
can be combined with the others to reach more or less certain conclusions.
Repressed memories similarly could be, and should be, the subject of an
assortment of methodologies, including clinical and experimental,
qualitative and quantitative, prospective and retrospective, and
psychological and neurological. Almost never will a study, or even a set of
studies, resolve whether a phenomenon as complex as repressed memories
exists and in what ways it might exist. Isolating the details surrounding this
alleged phenomenon should require a prodigious research effort. So far,
that research effort has produced little support for the claimed
phenomenon.4'
Given the structure of science, the distinction the Logerquist court
makes between deductive and inductive reasoning, for purposes of
admissibility standards, is chimerical. In fact, inductive reasoning does not
really exist separately. It always serves the process of deductive reasoning.
What the court called inductive reasoning is simply hypothesis formation
through anecdotal experience. The subject of repressed memories well
illustrates the point. In Logerquist, the plaintiffs expert, Dr. van der Kolk,
said that he had treated "hundreds of survivors of childhood sexual abuse,"
and that he was prepared to testify that some of these "victims do have
delayed memories, that their memories are as reasonably accurate as normal
memories, if not better. 'A2 How would he know something like this?
If the court had given the subject any thought, it would have realized
that this is a remarkable statement. In fact, it is almost as unbelievable as if
he had said that he could turn lead into gold. What sort of experience
would be necessary to support his claims about repressed memories? Most
importantly, he would have to have some idea of ground truth. How did the
expert determine that any allegations of abuse actually happened?
Somewhat less important, but much more arrogant, is the doctor's claim
that "delayed memories" are as "accurate as normal memories, if not
better., 43 Better? He thus claims experience with repressed memory and
normal memory formation, comparisons of the two, as well as the
investigatory capacity to check claims of abuse several decades old. That is
41. 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 8, at 581-82.
42. Logerquist, I P.3d at 117 (citing Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Memorandum to
Assist the Court in Evaluating the Admissibility of Expert Evidence).
43. Id.
2008]
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some very impressive experience.
In fact, of course, he claims no such experience. What he apparently
has had is experience with patients, some proportion of which manifest
symptoms consistent with repression. He treats these people, but there is no
reason to believe he can distinguish true memories from false memories or
has any basis for believing that the phenomenon is real. His expertise is
therapeutic, not forensic.
The basic error of Logerquist lies in the court's failure to critically
assess the proffered evidence in a scientifically sophisticated way. By his
own statement, the plaintiffs expert asserted that his opinion was informed,
in part, by the process of deduction from a scientific theory extant for over a
century.4 But this theory, built largely on a Freudian foundation, fails the
test of modernity. It is not simply that repression is not yet science, it has
repeatedly failed scientific attempts to validate it.245 The court's embrace of
personal experience of the truth of repressed memory over the contrary
record of scientific exploration is akin to continuing to believe in cold
fusion or even extra sensory perception (ESP). Despite fervent believers in
these phenomena, many of whom have personal experience with them, the
failure of science to demonstrate their validity must rule the day. This is
not to say that repressed memories, cold fusion, or ESP might not turnout to
be proved true one day. To be sure, science has yet to definitively disprove
them. But in science, as in the law, the proponent has the burden of proof.
Based on the record, that burden has not been met by proponents of
repressed memories.
2. Juror Credulity
Even if a realm of non-scientific expert opinion could be reliably
identified, is it reasonable to assume that no substantial threshold test is
necessary, because jurors can readily assess its validity and weight? This is
an issue that has received little research attention and certainly not enough
to provide significant insights into the matter. In fact, it is not entirely clear
what the substance of the claim is. According to the California Supreme
Court, the primary concern with scientific opinion is the possibly
overwhelming influence complex scientific evidence has on jurors.46 The
court observed that "[f]ay jurors tend to give considerable weight to
44. Id. The court quoted the witness's letter to counsel as follows: "I intend to testify that
amnesia for traumatic experiences, including for sexual abuse, has been documented in numerous
scientific reports for over a century.... I have conducted numerous studies on the nature of the
human response to trauma, including specifically on memory processes in responses." Id.
45. See 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 8, at 581-82.
46. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1248-51.
[Vol. 36
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'scientific' evidence when presented by 'experts' with impressive
credentials. 47 The Frye threshold, therefore, establishes a barrier in order
to protect against juror credulity. Non-scientific expert opinion, according
to the California high court, does not present a similar danger: "When a
witness gives his personal opinion on the stand - even if he qualifies as an
expert - the jurors may temper their acceptance of his testimony with a
healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that all human beings are
fallible. 48
The first premise of the California opinion rule is thus that jurors bring
a "healthy skepticism" to non-scientific expert opinion but fail to do so
when confronting scientifically based opinion. Why jurors would suspend
their critical faculties when hearing scientific opinion is not obvious.
Certainly, one explanation the California Supreme Court advanced,
"impressive credentials ' 49 of the scientific experts, is unlikely to be so,
since experts testifying to "personal opinion" typically have as impressive
resumes as those testifying to scientific opinion. Indeed, very often they are
the same people. The rule focuses on the content of the testimony, not the
credentials or scientific identity of the expert. Very often, so-called
scientific experts in California, and thus subject to Kelly-Frye, have no
advanced degrees, while those allowed to testify to personal opinion do
have advanced degrees.
A second premise implicit in the California approach is the apparent
belief that jurors are better able to parse personal opinion than they will be
to critique scientific opinion. The court in People v. Venegas50 summarized
this argument:
The Kelly test is intended to forestall the jury's uncritical acceptance of
scientific evidence or technology that is so foreign to everyday experience
as to be unusually difficult for laypersons to evaluate. In most other
instances, the jurors are permitted to rely on their own common sense and
good )judgment in evaluating the weight of the evidence presented to
them.
Although it might indeed challenge jurors to critically assess scientific
opinion, it is not clear that they are likely to do considerably better with
non-scientific opinion. How, in fact, should a juror evaluate non-scientific
opinion? The California Supreme Court advances common sense and good
47. Id. at 1245.
48. People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1984) overruled on other grounds by
People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265, 285-86 (Cal. 2000).
49. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245.
50. People v. Venegas, 954 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1998).
51. Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
2008]
714 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
judgment as if these characteristics were self-defining and obviously
applicable to the task at hand. In most cases, non-scientific opinion is based
on a combination of personal experience with the subject and professional
training.
Consider again the issue of repressed memories, a subject generally
thought to be exempt under the opinion rule.52 An expert might testify that
the plaintiff repressed her memory from a young age until adulthood, that
such a phenomenon has occurred in other cases, and that the memories
recalled are reliable. If you are a commonsensical juror with good
judgment, how do you assess this claim? There are an assortment of
possibilities, such as demeanor, the prospect of bias due to expert witness
fees, credentials, and admissions or inconsistent statements elicited on
cross-examination. Of course, all of these common sense good judgments
are available to critically assess scientific opinion as well. Other than these
standard indicia of reliability, all with questionable value, there is nothing
more. Non-scientific expert opinion is, in fact, little more than ipse dixit.
Repressed memories are so, because the expert has twenty years of
experience with the subject. By this measure, blood-letting and alchemy
were so too.
Cross-examination is unlikely to be particularly effective with well-
credentialed experts for another reason. Most of these witnesses fully
believe the content of their testimony. A lying witness may have sweaty
palms, avoid eye-contact, and stutter. A lying witness might also be caught
in a contradiction or be unable to explain prior inconsistent statements. But
many experience-based experts are fully convinced of the validity of their
judgment. Experience, after all, has failed to falsify their beliefs. The
weakness of their testimony does not lie with the witness, it lies with the
content of their opinion and the methods they used to form it. Experience
and observation, without question, are important and integral components
of scientific research. But they are typically employed to form hypotheses,
not confirm them. The history of science is replete with examples of
experience and observation - over decades and even centuries - that have
been demonstrated wrong when subjected to systematic and careful test.
Cross-examination could be used to reveal the fact that expert opinion
based on experience is profoundly weak in comparison to systematic
scientific test. This line of questioning, however, raises exactly the issue
that the California courts thought was avoided by their rule. Venegas'
reliance on "common sense and good judgment"53 does not help much in
52. See Wilson v. Phillips, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 206, 208 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
Kelly-Frye does not apply to repressed memory expert testimony).
53. Venegas, 954 P.2d at 546.
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assessing the value of scientific methods, or whether they could, or should,
have been brought to bear on the subject. This sort of critical analysis
requires exactly the sort of scientific sophistication that California courts
think jurors lack. California courts employ the Frye rule because they do
not trust jurors to have the background or ability to critically assess
scientific issues beyond what simple common sense and good judgment
would allow.
Although jurors may not be scientifically sophisticated, scientific
opinion testimony readily lends itself to critique, especially as compared to
experience-based opinions. Scientists customarily set forth the
methodological premises for their opinions, including both the general
research that describes the phenomenon in issue as well as the reasons why
this particular case is an instance of that phenomenon. Scientists routinely
itemize in detail research design, statistical analyses performed, methods of
data collection and coding, make-up of the sample population studied,
statistical strength of the results, and to what extent the methods and
principles employed in the research support the conclusions reached.
Hence, on the one hand, experience-based opinion is judged by whether the
witness is nervous, has sweaty palms, and fails to make eye-contact; on the
other hand, science-based opinion can be judged on these factors as well as
whether the research was prospective or retrospective, used comparison
groups, blinded experimenters to condition, used adequate statistical
measures, appropriate subject populations, and a score of other not-so-
difficult-to-understand criteria for high quality research.
California's practice of employing a restrictive test for science-based
expert opinion and a permissive test for experience-based expert opinion is
arguably the opposite of what good scientific common sense would
recommend. At the very least, however, there is no compelling basis for
California's approach of using two different tests for expert opinion
evidence. Expert opinion, whatever the ostensible foundation it rests upon,
presents similar dangers to jurors. Moreover, the factors that are likely to
be relevant to determining the weight of proffered expert opinion are
generally the same, whether the evidence is scientifically-based or
experience-based. Indeed, in Kumho Tire, this was the conclusion the
United States Supreme Court reached in regard to whether Daubert's
judicial gatekeeping obligations extended to non-scientific expert
testimony.54  The Court held that Daubert "applies to all expert
testimony. '55 Despite this injunction, significant portions of federal
54. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147.
55. Id.
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Although the Daubert test was first framed in a civil case amidst the
swirl of controversy surrounding fears of exploding litigation, the rule
applies similarly to criminal cases. 57  Rule 70258 does not distinguish
between the civil and criminal contexts in regard to expert testimony. In
fact, much of Daubert's early evolution occurred through court responses to
DNA evidence offered in criminal cases.59
While Daubert ostensibly applies in the same way in criminal and civil
cases, social scientists have increasingly raised the issue whether courts, in
fact, employ Daubert more lackadaisically in criminal trials - especially in
regard to prosecution evidence. 60 Early research lends some credence to
this belief. Several studies have examined the patterns of admissibility
decisions in cases decided prior to and after the adoption of Daubert,
casting at least some light on the behavior of both federal and state courts in
several categories of cases.6 1 Comparisons of the rate of pretrial challenges
to the admissibility of expert evidence before and following Daubert found,
overall, a marked increase.62 But, in the civil arena, Risinger found nearly
90% of the challenges being raised by defendants against plaintiffs' expert
evidence.63 Among the criminal cases, where the overwhelming bulk of
expert evidence is offered by the government, defendants are far less active
56. Portions of this section are drawn from 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 8,
at 101-05.
57. United States v. Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 808 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Daubert does apply to
criminal cases.").
58. FED. R. EVID. 702.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 562 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that DNA
evidence was properly admitted because DNA profiling and the basic procedures used were
generally accepted in the scientific community); Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F. Supp.
1054, 1073-74 (D.V.t. 1993) (concluding that the DNA profiling process was relevant and reliable
and thus DNA evidence was admissible).
60. See Risinger, supra note 23; see also Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on
the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L., 339, 364 (2002); Mark P. Denebeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert
Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 74
(2003); Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertice in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 105, 109-10 (2003).
61. See Groscup et al., supra note 59.
62. Risinger, supra note 23, at 103-04.
63. Id. at 145.
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in bringing challenges, often failing to raise objections that would have
been reasonable and available, and which presumably would have been
raised in a civil case involving evidence with similarly weak foundations.64
In federal courts, of the challenges to expert evidence brought, fewer than
10% were in criminal cases. 65  Of those, the prosecution brought more
challenges to defense evidence than vice-versa by a ratio of 7:2, though the
government presents the far larger target for attack.66
If a challenge is mounted, what is the federal court response? In civil
cases, the answer is that the post-Daubert courts are more likely to exclude
challenged expert evidence than they had been before.67 Dixon and Gill
found exclusion of challenged expert evidence to result about 50% of the
time pre-Daubert, rising to as much as 70% in years post-Daubert.68 In
Krafka et al.'s surveys conducted both before and after Daubert, federal
judges reported excluding or limiting challenged expert evidence 25% of
the time pre-Daubert compared to 41% of the time post-Daubert.69 But as
between plaintiffs and defendants, the data reveal a notable lack of
symmetry.70 Risinger found that defendants succeeded about two-thirds of
the time in the many federal cases in which they challenged plaintiff
experts.71 In the smaller set of cases where plaintiffs challenged defense
experts, the challenges succeeded less than half the time.72
On the criminal side, the picture is quite different. Risinger found that,
post-Daubert, in federal district courts, defense challenges to government
evidence succeeded less than 10% of the time. 3 Government challenges to
defense evidence succeeded two-thirds of the time.74 On appeal, defense-
proffered expertise was found to have been properly excluded 83% of the
time.7 5 Prosecution-proffered expertise that had been admitted at trial was
excluded only once on appeal.76
"Of course, none of this," as Risinger notes, "goes directly to the
64. Id. at 109-10.
65. Id. at 109.
66. Id. at 109.
67. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding
Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 309, 330 (2002).
68. L. Dixon & B. Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal
Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (2001).
69. Krafka et al., supra note 66, at 322.
70. Risinger, supra note 23, at 110.
71. Id. at 108.
72. Id. at 108.
73. Id. at 111.
74. Id. at 110.
75. Id. at 108.
76. Risinger, supra note 23, at 108.
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validity of any given decision," but the data "are fairly striking in their own
right."77 One possibility is that the differences between civil and criminal
cases reflect meaningful differences in science being used or its application
to the different groups of cases, and that there are systematic differences
between the factual issues that arise in civil and criminal cases. Or,
perhaps, the differential outcomes are attributable to difference in the
quality of advocacy (borne of difference in resources) in the two realms.
On the other hand, it might be suggested that social and political differences
explain the differential treatment: that, as a general proposition, judges
disfavor civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants and are more likely to rule
against them than against their opposites when presenting equivalent
evidence or arguments. A more definitive explanation of the pattern awaits
future research.
Nonetheless, there are assorted hints that federal courts use a Daubert-
permissive admissibility scheme for prosecution-based expert opinion,
while in the civil arena they use a Daubert-restrictive test. For example,
Risinger's analyses of decisions by type of expert evidence proffered in
criminal cases, as well as other reviews of government "science" in criminal
cases,78 suggest that if Daubert gatekeeping were rationally based on the
quality of the underlying expert evidence, the exclusion rate pursuant to
defense challenges would be higher than it is. 79 Even a casual glance at
many courts' treatment of prosecution experts, from police officers to
bitemark identification, suggests a leniency applied to the government that
is not enjoyed by civil plaintiffs.
Federal courts' Daubert failures generally fall into two categories. In
the first, and more common, courts simply defer to the government's theory
regarding the validity of the proffered expert testimony. Under this
approach, the courts appear to mouth the suggested criteria of Daubert,
such as testing, error rate, peer review, and general acceptance, but register
little or no interest in actually considering the import of those criteria for the
case-at-hand. In these cases, the Daubert criteria become a mantra to recite,
but without any seeming conscious understanding. The second category of
Daubert failure occurs when the courts appear to take the suggested criteria
seriously, but apply them in a fantastically ignorant fashion. In many ways
this category is worse than the mantra-reciting category, because it indicates
an affirmative illiteracy regarding basic scientific concepts.
In the first category of Daubert-as-mantra, two cases are worth
77. Id. at 108.
78. See, e.g., 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 8, at 16-17.
79. See, e.g., id. at 19-23.
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considering, United States v. Allen8 ° and United States v. Hicks.8' In United
States v. Allen,82 the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in admitting
expert testimony regarding shoe-print identification. The defendant argued
that this testimony did not pass muster under Daubert.83  The court
responded to this assertion by relating the statements made by two of the
state's experts, that "accurate comparisons require a trained eye; the
techniques for shoe-print identification are generally accepted in the
forensic community; and the methodologies are subject to peer review."
84
The court did not otherwise assess the claims that shoe-print identification
has achieved "general acceptance," or that it is "peer-reviewed.,
85
In United States v. Hicks,86 the defendant claimed that the trial court
should have excluded the government's expert's opinion that the shell
casings recovered from the scene of the shooting had been fired from a rifle
retrieved from the defendant's home.8 7  The court simply recited the
expert's claimed basis for his opinion, without critically assessing even the
somewhat incredible claim that this technique has a zero or near zero error
rate. 88 The court stated as follows:
[S]tandards controlling firearms comparison testing exist. As [the expert]
testified at the state-court Daubert hearing, he followed well-accepted
methods and scientific procedures in making his comparisons. He also
testified in federal court that the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark
Examiners produces literature about firearms comparison testing that he
relied on and that is authoritative in the field of firearms and tool mark
examination. Further buttressing the reliability of his methodology, [the
expert] also testified at the state-court Daubert hearing that the error rate
of firearms comparison testing is zero or near zero.89
In the second category, what might be called the scientific illiteracy
cases, one in particular stands out. In United States v. Havvard,90 the
defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the government's
80. United States v. Allen, 390 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2004).
81. United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2004).
82. 390 F.3d at 950.
83. Id. at 949.
84. Id. at 949-50.
85. Id. (The court held that the shoe print evidence was properly admitted without further
addressing the general acceptance of peer review claims.)
86. Hicks, 389 F.3d at 514.
87. Id. at 523.
88. Id. at 526.
89. Id. at 526.
90. United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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fingerprint expert under Daubert and Kumho Tire.91 The defense argued
that "there is no reliable statistical foundation for fingerprint comparisons
and no reliable measure of error rates in latent print identification,
especially in the absence of a specific standard about the number of points
of identity needed to support an opinion as to identification. 92  The
government, in response, suggested that "fingerprint identification is so
well-established that the court should not even hold a hearing on the
issue.",93 The court, however, ruled that a hearing was necessary, because
"it is clear that the court has no discretion as to whether to evaluate
reliability.
94
The court went on to apply the Daubert factors in a way that
approaches a caricature of scientific standards.95  The court observed first
that "the methods of latent print identification can be and have been
tested.",96 The court explained:
They have been tested for roughly 100 years. They have been tested in
adversarial proceedings with the highest possible stakes - liberty and
sometimes life. The defense has offered no evidence in this case
undermining the reliability of the methods in general. The government
points out correctly that if anyone were to come across a case in which
two different fingers had identical fingerprints, that news would flash
around the legal world at the speed of light. It has not happened in 100
97years.
Obviously, Daubert's reference to testing involves studies by scientists,
not cross-examination by lawyers in the courtroom. If the court's definition
of testing were correct, then no previously admitted scientific evidence
could be subsequently challenged, at least until the opponents of the
evidence produced research refuting it.98 In addition, the court confuses
91. Id. at 849.
92. Id. at 850-51.
93. Id. at 851.
94. Id.
95. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 853-54. The court's ignorance of science was compounded
by its superciliousness. For instance, it noted that a hearing was necessary despite the fact that its
"decision may strike some as comparable to a breathless announcement that the sky is blue and
the sun rose in the east yesterday." Id. at 849. Of course, unlike finding that the sky is blue, the
ability of fingerprint examiners to reliably identify the person who left a partial latent fingerprint
is not merely a product of casual observation.
96. Haward, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
97. Id.
98. Also, the Havvard court appears to place the burden of proof on the defendant when
Daubert places it squarely on the proponent of the evidence. Id. at 855 (denying Defendant's
motion to exclude the government's proffered opinion testimony because he failed to call his own




two testable hypotheses pertinent in these cases. Even if, as the court
believes, every person's fingerprints are unique, this does not mean that
forensic scientists have the ability to make reliable identifications. The
operative question for the law is whether fingerprint examiners can reliably
"match" a known fingerprint to an unknown print that may be smudged,
little more than a fragment, or otherwise severely degraded. The court cited
no validity or proficiency tests whatsoever on this issue.
99
The court next found that the peer review and publication requirements
were met for fingerprint identification. 100 The peer review comes from the
fact that it is routine practice in government laboratories to have a second
examiner compare the prints. 0 ' However, as the court acknowledged, this
is not done blind.10 2 It is also hardly the sort of "peer review" ordinarily
associated with science. For the court, the publication requirement was met
by the same one-hundred years of "adversarial testing"'1 3 that satisfied the
first Daubert prong. Needless to say, perhaps, this is not what the Daubert
court had in mind.
As regards the last Daubert factor the Havvard court considered,1
04
error rates, the government claimed that the "error rate for the method is
zero." 0 5 The court was disinclined to believe this "breathtaking" claim,
pointing out that individual examiners could make mistakes.' 0 6 The court
found that "[e]ven allowing for the possibility of individual error, the error
rate with latent print identification is vanishingly small when it is subject to
fair adversarial testing and challenge."'' 0 7 The court never explained how it
99. Id. at 853 (The Court explained that a fingerprint expert goes through a four-step process
to analyze fingerprints, but did not state that the fingerprint expert in this case went through any of
these tests.)
100. Id. at 854.
101. Id. at 853.
102. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 853.
103. Id. at 854.
104. The Havvard court, somewhat surprisingly, did not discuss whether latent fingerprint
identification was "generally accepted," the fourth factor suggested in Daubert. Among forensic
specialists who practice this trade for a living, it is undoubtedly generally accepted. See
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 32-33 (Mass. 2005) (finding fingerprint
identification admissible under Daubert because it was generally accepted among fingerprint
examiners). If a broader community of scientific methodologists were surveyed, general
acceptance might not be met. See David M. Siegel et al., The Reliability of Latent Print
Individualization: Brief of Amici Curiae submitted on Behalf of Scientists and Scholars by The
New England Innocence Project, Commonwealth v. Patterson, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 21, 27-29
(2006); see also 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 8, at 302-03 (fingerprint
identification).
105. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
106. Id. at 854.
107. Id.
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knew this to be so.
V. CONCLUSION
Much of the debate surrounding standards of admissibility has revolved
around the question whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert tightened or relaxed the standards for expert opinion evidence.
Although this is not an uninteresting matter to explore, it somewhat misses
a more important issue. Specifically, jurisdictions should consider more
explicitly the question of what sort of admissibility regime ought to apply to
expert evidence, given the legal and scientific values they wish to advance.
A jurisdiction's admissibility rules might vary along two basic
dimensions. The first concerns what criteria trial courts use to assess
proffered expert testimony. In most cases today, this is fundamentally a
choice between a general acceptance test, as established in Frye, and the
validity test, which is at the core of Daubert. The second dimension of a
jurisdiction's admissibility rule concerns the threshold level chosen for
admitting evidence. This dimension might vary from permissive to
rigorous, with a permissive standard permitting a greater amount of expert
evidence to reach the trier of fact. Hence, a jurisdiction's admissibility
regime might fall into one of four basic approaches to the problem of
managing expert opinion: (1) Daubert-rigorous, (2) Daubert-permissive, (3)
Frye-rigorous, and (4) Frye-permissive.
Complicating the basic scheme of admissibility is the practice in some
jurisdictions of using different regimes for different kinds of expert
evidence. This essay considers two such examples. The first is California's
practice of exempting non-scientific expert opinion from its ordinarily
applicable Frye-restrictive admissibility regime. The second is the apparent
federal practice of employing a more lenient standard for forensic science
evidence (seemingly using a Daubert-permissive approach) than is applied
in other contexts, such as toxic tort or product liability civil cases, in which
a Daubert-restrictive rule is generally employed. Neither the California
rule nor the federal practice is justified by scientific or logical principles or,
indeed, by basic common sense.
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